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1. About the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS) 
 
The Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle 
University, is a research centre internationally renowned for its academic excellence 
and policy relevance in local, regional and urban development, governance and policy. 
Founded in 1977, further details of our work are available at: www.ncl.ac.uk/curds 
 
 
2. Context and aim of the submission 
 
We welcome the Commission’s interest in the important issue of devolution in 
England. This submission aims to consider the UK 2070 Commission’s proposals for 
decentralisation in England and specifically the establishment of trans-regional 
‘provinces’ by situating them in their national and international context in Europe and 
assessing their appropriateness as governance arrangements. 
 
The UK and especially England remains amongst the most highly centralised amongst 
major countries internationally (Table 1, Appendix). The UK had a stable level of 
decentralisation between 1950 and 1986, underwent further centralisation until the late 
1990s devolution, and then settled at a relatively higher level (Figure 1). In addition, 
the UK and England have longstanding and persistent geographical disparities in 
economic and social conditions that are high in international context. The gini index of 
inequality of GDP per capita remains above the OECD average and reduced only 
slightly over 2000-2013 (Figure 2).  
 
While the causal relationship between centralised governance and spatial disparities 
is not clear and direct, it has been a consistent association in UK political-economic 
and geographical history.1 The need to find appropriate forms of decentralised 
governance for England has been a recurrent concern.2 In the post-war period, 
episodes of decentralisation are evident that resemble a pendulum swinging between 
different geographical scales and institutional arrangements (Figure 3). 
 
 
1 McCann, P. (2016) The Regional-National Economic Problem: Geography, Globalisation and 
Governance, Routledge: London.| 
2 Marlow, D. (2014) English Devolution and Intermediate Tiers of Governance, LGiU Briefing, 
December, LGiU: London. 
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Since 2010, there has been an ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal episode of 
decentralisation. Multiple rationales have been stated, pulling decentralisation in 
different directions and muddling its precise objectives. These rationales comprise 
local growth, public service reform and expenditure reductions, democratic renewal, 
and societal challenges such as ageing and climate change. 
 
This episode is also characterised by deals and deal-making as negotiated central-
local government agreements on decentralised powers, responsibilities and 
resources. Differentiated combinations of powers and resources have been allocated 
to different areas (Figure 4). 
 
This recent decentralisation episode has created a complex map and patchwork of 
different governance arrangements across England. While other countries such as 
France, Italy and Spain have what are termed ‘asymmetrical’ or geographically uneven 
decentralised governance systems with different powers and resources allocated to 
different areas, the degree of asymmetry in England is acute. Asymmetrical forms of 
decentralisation have potential benefits and costs (Table 2). 
 
 
3. Definitions, rationales, benefits and costs of decentralisation 
 
Decentralisation is defined as the allocation of powers and resources from national 
to sub-national levels of government. There are different kinds of decentralisation, 
distinguished by their powers and resources, that range from the highest level 
devolution to the lowest level administrative (Table 3). What is called ‘devolution’ in 
the discussions about decentralised governance in England is more accurately 
termed delegation because of the limited nature of the powers and resources 
involved. The main rationales for decentralised governance are better matching of 
public expenditure and services to local preferences, mobilisation of local knowledge 
on economic potential and costs and increased accountability of local governments 
to citizens. Depending upon its form and combination of powers and resources, 
decentralisation can generate potential benefits and costs (Table 4). 
 
 
4. The UK 2070 Commission’s proposals for decentralisation 
 
In the context of the problem of intermediate governance in England and the 
complex patchwork of current arrangements, the Commission’s proposals for 
“effective devolution” comprise:  
• Increasing devolution of powers and resources to the “local” level to a 
“comprehensive framework” of mayoral and combined authorities and rural 
counties;  
• Setting-up four new “trans-regional arrangements” for “provinces” for the 
North, Midlands, South East and South West constituted from existing local 
leaders and aiming to “complement” strategic planning for pan-regional issues 
at the local and joint or combined authority level; 
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• Decentralising national government functions, responsibilities and budgets 
covering England to “align with” the “local and trans-regional devolution”3.  
Similar proposals were originally outlined in the IPPR Commission on Economic 
Justice recommendations to create a “new tier” of “English regional authorities” or 
“economic executives” that would be “responsible for regional economic and 
industrial strategy” and “able to deploy significant assets and capabilities”.4 
The proposed Northern and Midlands Economic Executives would be created from 
the existing Northern Powerhouse and Midlands Engine institutions. National 
consultation was suggested for the new South East and South West Economic 
Executives. 
Focused on economic development functions at the regional level, the proposed 
responsibilities for the Economic Executives included: 
• regional industrial strategies including innovation clusters, supply chains and 
inward investment 
• regional infrastructure planning including transport, energy, communications 
and environmental and resource management  
• regional immigration policy 
• regional spending of a new ‘Inclusive Growth Fund’ 
• oversight of inter-city rail networks and franchises and a proposed new ‘major 
road network’ 
• oversight of the regional divisions of a new ‘National Investment Bank.  
The proposed Economic Executives were seen as large enough to represent their 
regions internationally to attract investment and people, exercise political voice to 
secure resources from central government, borrow to invest through the regional 
divisions of a new National Investment Bank and, following the example of the 
Northern Powerhouse and Midlands Engine, overcome lower scale rivalries between 
cities and towns. 
In terms of governance and democratic accountability, the proposal is that each 
Economic Executive would be governed by a new Regional Council elected indirectly 
from their constituent local authorities. Proposed funding arrangements were based 
initially on a block grant from HM Treasury and then a new and more decentralised 
fiscal framework for England. 
 
5. English ‘Provinces’ in context: European regional governance geography 
In the context of past English regional governance geography, the proposed Provinces 
are remarkably large. This can be demonstrated by comparing them to the nine 
 
3 UK 2070 Commission (2019: 9) Fairer and Stronger: Rebalancing the UK Economy, UK 2070 
Commission: Sheffield.  
4 IPPR Commission on Economic Justice (2018: 70, 68) Prosperity and Justice: A Plan for the New 
Economy, IPPR: London. 
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Standard Regions, which are now only used for statistical purposes but until 2010 
constituted the regional tier of decentralised institutions in England. Two of the 
Provinces (North, South-East) each group three Standard Regions, and one other 
(Midland) combines two. This geography raises the question of whether the proposal 
for large Provinces appears to be out-of-line when compared to the regional 
institutions with economic development responsibilities in comparable countries of 
Europe. Table 5 identifies the five larger European Union countries taken here to offer 
some comparability to the UK, comparing them on three relevant size measures: 
population, economy and land area. 
 
Table 6 then identifies for each of these countries the regional tier of institutions with 
devolved economic development responsibilities, reporting their number and their 
average size on each of the three size parameters. This comparison does suggest 
that the English Provinces, when taken along with the other UK Nations (Scotland, 
Wales, N.Ireland) which they are proposed to sit alongside, are rather out-of-line when 
their average size values are compared with those of the principal regional institutions 
in the five comparator countries. The key reason is that there are only seven 
Provinces/Nations, whereas the other countries are divided into around two-to-three 
times more regions. The one size measure on which the UK regional average is not 
the larger than all the comparators is land area: the highest average is that of the 
French Regions, while the Spanish equivalent is also close to that of the proposed 
seven authorities in the UK. 
  
Although land area size might not seem very relevant to economic development policy, 
its significance stems from the long-term trend for the integration of previously distinct 
local economies. Thus an authority with a narrowly defined area, such as a single city, 
might independently deliver some economic development policies (e.g. those related 
to land use), but delivering a comprehensive regional economic strategy (and perhaps 
having some tax raising powers) is more realistically entrusted to an authority covering 
a larger and self-contained territory such as Scotland. This is an economic geography 
aspect to the principle of subsidiarity: the appropriate size of regions depends on the 
extent and nature of the powers which are to be devolved to them. The high level of 
interactions across the boundary of a geographically small region, such as London, 
means that policies operating solely within that boundary are unable to match the scale 
of the key processes determining regional economic development. 
  
Table 7 ranks by population the seven proposed Provinces/Nations alongside all the 
regions with devolved economic development responsibilities in the five comparator 
countries whose populations are 5 million or above. France has seven such regions, 
Germany has six, Italy has four, Spain three and Poland just one. This might suggest 
that the proposal for the UK is not out-of-line with practice elsewhere, due to not only 
Germany but also France having more regions with over 5 million residents than would 
the UK with its four English Provinces together with Scotland. It is significant that 
France has the highest number of larger population regions: several of these regions 
are recent amalgamations of previously separate smaller regions, which is an example 
of a trend towards larger regions that is in part a response to economic processes 
operating over wider areas.   
  
Table 7, taken together with the count of regions in Table 6, does offer some support 
for an alternative interpretation. Only two of the seven proposed UK Provinces/Nations 
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– and none of those in England – have fewer than 5 million residents, whereas in four 
of the five comparator countries over two-thirds of their regions are of this smaller size. 
Even in recently reorganised France the proportion is almost half. At the other end of 
the scale, three of the four Provinces proposed for England have populations of 10 
million or more, a proportion unmatched in any comparator country. All these three 
Provinces also have land areas whose sizes put them at the upper end of the range 
to be seen among the large population regions in Table 7. 
  
England has been ‘regionalised’ by government (and indeed academics) several times 
previously but none of these regional boundaries have been widely accepted, in part 
due to none having the historical ‘authenticity’ and cultural and political identities of 
regions such as Bayern, Lombardia or Catalunya. The relatively large population and 
area size of the proposed English Provinces might be seen as a realistic structure 
designed to tackle processes operating over large areas in a highly integrated space 
economy. Yet it is also arguable that the Provinces are a technocratic proposal that is 
fated to fail as a result of a lack of popular identification with its new amalgamated 
regions. Finding the appropriate balance and geography is challenging. Drawing lines 
on maps to limit jurisdictions is relatively straight-forward, but creating meaningful local 
and regional boundaries is more difficult. Since 2010 in England, the approach has 
been to prioritise ‘functional' economic areas’ – for example reflecting ‘travel to work 
areas’. However, effective regional governance requires the support of citizens. 
Questions of local and regional identity matter because boundaries also need to pay 
attention to a shared sense of place and patterns of belonging and attachment.5 
Successful democratic polities operate across territories that are understood to have 
real meaning to citizens and voters. Where this is not the case, it can be a recipe for 
indifference or dysfunction. Centrally determined boundaries, which make sense in 
Whitehall, can produce regions that have little popular affiliation. Such regions may 
dispense large amounts of tax-payers money in ways which appear opaque and 
unaccountable. Equally, the deal-making approach to decentralisation can produce 
regions that are neither functional nor popular in ways that can set back to aim of 
democratic decentralisation. On this point too, the recent experience in France is of 
interest because there was considerable dissatisfaction at the amalgamation of 
historic regions (e.g. Alsace, Lorraine and the Champagne becoming the new ahistoric 
region Grand Est).  
 
The conclusion is that while the proposed English Provinces are indeed relatively large 
on average, the only one notably out-of-line with regions in comparator countries is 
the South East (due to including both London and its wide hinterland). At this point it 
is relevant to recall the principle that the appropriate size of regions depends on the 
extent and nature of the powers which are to be devolved to them. Large regions such 
as the proposed Provinces may be appropriate for a highly integrated economic 
geography such as that of England, but perhaps only if each Province is entrusted with 
powers similar to those of Scotland, including the ability to raise its own taxes. 
 
 
 
 
5 Tomaney, J. (2018) “A mess of pottage? The North of Tyne deal and the travails of devolution”, LSE 
British Politics and Policy Blog, 4 January, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-north-of-tyne-
deal-and-the-travails-of-devolution/ 
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6. Local mayoral and combined authorities and rural counties and trans-
regional ‘provinces’ as governance arrangements for England   
 
The UK’s 2070 proposals for decentralisation effectively aim to move towards a 
system of multi-level governance in England which are evident in other comparable 
countries. The proposals would effectively fill-in the map of England with mayoral and 
combined authorities and rural counties at the ‘local’ level and introduce a new level 
of trans-regional economic executives at the level of the four new provinces. 
 
This reform potentially creates a more comprehensive and even coverage of 
governance arrangements across England. What kind of decentralisation this  
represents will depend upon the powers and resources decentralised to the existing 
and new mayoral and combined authorities and rural counties and provincial economic 
executives (Table 3). Questions of the size of the regions would then need to be 
related to their purpose, powers and resources. 
 
Evaluating the potential effectiveness of decentralisation confronts difficult issues. 
Establishing whether or not decentralised governance enables better decision-making 
and generates benefits for economic and social outcomes and public policy objectives 
is not straightforward. This is because of numerous problems: the development of 
appropriate proxies relevant to particular national contexts; assembling available data 
of appropriate quality, historical coverage and international comparability; 
disentangling and isolating the effects of decentralisation; and, attributing causation 
amongst decentralisation’s multiple relationships with broader economic and 
institutional change.6 
 
Key questions emerge in considering the proposed new governance geography for 
England:  
 
• Can these new arrangements maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of 
decentralisation and what would the net outcome be? 
 
• Could they better match public expenditure and services to citizen preferences 
at the local and trans-regional levels?  
 
• Would they gain enhanced knowledge on economic potential and costs?  
 
• Would the arrangements increase the accountability of local governments to 
citizens? Indirect election is a feature of the proposed new arrangements at the 
local and trans-regional levels, potentially echoing the charge of weak 
accountability and scrutiny levelled at the Regional Assemblies/Chambers in 
England during the 2000s. 
 
Considering the political feasibility of the proposals raises some difficult issues given 
the history of decentralisation in England and its ad hoc and piecemeal evolution of 
institutional arrangements since 2010. The pendulum swings have created churn and 
 
6 Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A., Tomaney, J., Torrisi, G. and Tselios, V. (2012) “In search of the 
‘economic dividend’ of devolution: spatial disparities, spatial economic policy, and decentralisation in 
the UK”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30, 1, 10-28. 
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disruption (Figure 3), described as “compulsive re-organisation” and “perpetual 
restructuring”.7 Further changes and the establishment of new mayoral and combined 
authorities and rural counties in areas currently without them may encounter 
resistance and would take time. In other countries with asymmetrical decentralisation 
such as Spain, the evidence is that as new areas gain powers and resources the 
existing areas push for even greater levels of decentralisation. 
 
Setting-up new executives at the trans-regional level would be similarly challenging. 
While building upon existing institutions in the Northern Powerhouse area is a potential 
way forward this is likely to be more difficult for the Midlands Engine which lacks an 
institutional basis and capacity in its current form. Crucially, this approach would be 
much more problematic in the South East and South West given their histories and 
more recent antipathies to trans-regional collaboration. Existing co-operation – such 
as the Cambridge-Milton Keynes-Oxford Arc – are thematically focused and working 
on different geographies.   
 
Indeed, the description of the regional executives as a ‘new tier’ of institutions and 
administration will inevitably attract criticism from its opponents which are likely to 
characterise it as another layer of administration and bureaucracy and talking shop for 
politicians – reusing the arguments from the campaign against the Elected Regional 
Assembly in north east England in 2004.8 
 
The proposed arrangements will encounter the issue of how to align, co-ordinate and 
integrate its new institutions between and across different spatial levels. How will their 
aspirations/visions, strategies and spending plans be aligned, co-ordinated and 
integrated? Where will the legitimate locus of power to prioritise reside? How will new 
institutions and activities mesh with existing institutions? If, for example, the new 
regional executives are tasked with writing a set of regional and industrial strategies, 
how will they connect with the existing LEPs and their local industrial strategies? 
 
7. Further and future decentralisation in England 
Given the ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal nature of the recent episode of 
decentralisation in England and the difficulties in assessing its impacts, a more 
comprehensive and thoughtful approach is needed to thinking through and 
implementing further decentralisation in existing and new areas yet to be allocated 
powers and resources if the potential benefits are to be maximised and the costs and 
risks reduced. 
 
There is a need for the clarification of the rationales and principles of decentralisation 
with a ‘road map’ and process to provide some clarity to the vision, direction, purpose, 
principles and strategy for decentralised governance of England in the round.9  
 
7 Jones, A. (2010: 374) “Here we go again: the pathology of compulsive re-organisation”, Local 
Economy, 25, 5-6, 373-378. Mulgan, G. (2010: 1) “RDA demise”, Regeneration and Renewal, 12 July, 
Regeneration and Renewal: London. 
8 Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2006) “‘Just another expensive talking shop’: public attitudes and the 
2004 regional assembly referendum in the North East of England”, Regional Studies, 40, 8, 927-936. 
9 Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2016) Decentralisation: Issues, 
Principles and Practice, CURDS: Newcastle University. 
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The current ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal governance needs to move towards 
a more planned, transformative and comprehensive approach. It will, however, need 
to work with the patchwork of the different geographical scales and institutions of 
governance that have emerged in England since 2010. 
 
This is not a call for a top-down blueprint designed and delivered from Whitehall in 
London. It is a call for open, transparent and systematic approach. Such a road map 
would provide greater fairness and equity in setting out what kinds of powers and 
resources are on offer for places. For those areas at the earliest stages of thinking 
through what decentralisation might mean for them, it could provide a normative sense 
of the kinds of powers and resources that specific types of areas should be seeking. 
Such a clear road map would remove the existing opaqueness and lack of 
accountability of the current deals designed, formulated and made between political 
leaders and senior officials at the local and national levels. Otherwise, the problems 
and costs of co-ordination, integration and alignment between governance actors and 
institutions will be reproduced and, potentially, multiply as further pieces are added to 
the existing patchwork.  
 
Given the change in government in July 2019 and the dominance of Brexit in national 
political economy, it is difficult to assess the new administration’s commitment to 
decentralisation in England. Decentralisation slowed under the last government 
following the EU referendum in 2016 and general election in 2017, afflicted by ‘Brexit 
blight’ and lack of political and administrative capacity in Parliament and Whitehall. In 
principle the UK government’s ‘Devolution Framework’ may provide some of the 
elements of this decentralisation ‘road map’. However, its publication has been 
delayed until “after Brexit” and details of its aims and content are as yet unknown.10 
 
In July 2019, the new Prime Minister announced support to “level up the powers 
offered to mayors” to enable “more people” to “benefit from the kind of local 
government structures” in London and Greater Manchester and to provide 
“communities a greater say over changes to transport, housing, public services and 
infrastructure that will benefit their areas and drive local growth”.11 He restated an 
ambition for “levelling up across every nation and region across the UK, providing 
support to towns and cities and closing the opportunity gap in our society”12 and made 
announcements on a Towns Fund, the Northern Powerhouse and public expenditure 
on transport infrastructure in northern England and further Growth Deals in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.13  
 
Wherever decentralisation in England goes next, its kind, nature and resources are 
critical. There is a need for the meaningful decentralisation of powers and resources 
 
10 Larsson, N. and Peters, D. (2019) “Further delay to devolution drive”, The Municipal Journal, 24 
April, https://www.themj.co.uk/Further-delay-to-devolution-drive/213469. 
11 Johnson, B. (2019) PM Speech at Manchester Science and Industry Museum, 27 July, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-manchester-science-and-industry-museum 
12 Johnson, B. (2019) PM statement on priorities for the government, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-priorities-for-the-government-25-july-
2019 
13 Press Release (2019) ty, 28 July, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-launches-
new-growth-deals-funding-as-he-kicks-off-union-visits-in-scotland 
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to enable places to tailor place-based institutions, policies and public services to 
address their particular combinations of aspirations and needs.  
 
There is evidence that the current episode of decentralisation in England and its 
hallmark deals and deal-making approach are reaching their zenith. First, areas that 
secured deals in earlier waves are increasingly seeking further deals in a bid to acquire 
additional powers and resources, reproducing the deal-based model of governance 
reform and public policy-making with all its benefits and costs.14  
 
Second, areas putting forward deal proposals are having to wait for Ministerial and 
civil servant consideration and response, demonstrating the lack of political 
prioritisation and administrative capacity at the national level, or receiving rejections 
for not meeting certain criteria. For example, the One Yorkshire proposals in 2018 
were rejected by the former Secretary of State James Brokenshire because they “do 
not meet our devolution criteria”.15 Yet any such criteria have not been published. 
 
Third, knitting together the strategic aims and work of the decentralised institutions 
and their differentiated powers and resources within the broader patchwork is 
becoming more difficult as it becomes more complex. While there is some evidence 
of co-operation and joint announcements amongst the higher profile metro-mayors16, 
evidence is limited that the overall system of governance in England is working as 
coherently and effectively as it might. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Overall, this submission is not an argument against further decentralisation, especially 
given the UK and England’s highly centralised system, nor is it a call for further caution 
and a slower approach or for a faster, radical and revolutionary ‘big bang’ strategy. 
Rather, the submission highlights the need comprehensively to think through and 
clarify what decentralisation is for and how it works in England and to set this out in a 
clear, open and transparent road map.  
 
This task will be especially important in the context of future disruptive change 
especially Brexit. Some advocates of decentralisation see it as the ‘golden thread’ of 
Brexit and an opportunity to reverse centralisation and ‘take back control’ of local 
affairs from a distant and unresponsive national government and political 
establishment.17 There are political risks in limiting decentralisation too. The lack of 
 
14 GM is on 8 or 9 devolution deals, West Midlands looking for another?. Sharman, L. (2019) 
“Liverpool submits £230m ‘Green City Deal’”, Local Government, 30 July, 
https://www.localgov.co.uk/Liverpool-submits-230m-Green-City-Deal/47894.  
15 James Brokenshire quoted in Elledge, J. (2018) “James Brokenshire’s rejection of the One 
Yorkshire devolution deal absolutely stinks of partisanship”, Citymetric, 12 February, 
https://www.citymetric.com/politics/james-brokenshire-s-rejection-one-yorkshire-devolution-deal-
absolutely-stinks-partisanship 
16 Sandford, M. (2017) “Soft power and grant coalitions: the first six months of ‘metro-mayors’”, 
January, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/soft-power-and-grant-coalitions-first-six-months-metro-
mayors 
17 Pike, A. (2018) “Devolution in England needs real powers and resources if it is to ‘take back control’ 
in Brexit”, The UK in a Changing Europe Blog, 20 June,  https://ukandeu.ac.uk/devolution-in-england-
needs-real-powers-and-resources-if-it-is-to-take-back-control-in-brexit/ 
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economic opportunities and voice for so-called ‘left behind’ people and places and 
perceived unfairness has fuelled the discontent and political fragmentation and 
division in recent years across the UK.18 Lack of public engagement and interest in 
the current episode of decentralisation is already evident, for example in turnouts in 
the Durham County Council devolution deal ballot and metro-mayor election and 
Police and Crime Commissioner elections. Engaging the public more effectively 
suggests the need to do decentralisation in a different way. 
 
  
 
18 Tomaney, J. and Pike, A. (2018) “Brexit, devolution and economic development in ‘left-behind’ 
regions”, Welsh Economic Review, 26, 29-37, http://doi.org/10.18573/wer. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Regional Authority Index, ranked by country, 2010* 
 
Country Regional Authority Index 
Germany 37.0 
Spain 33.6 
Belgium 33.1 
United States 29.6 
Italy 27.3 
Austria 23.0 
Brazil 19.5 
Netherlands 17.5 
Japan 13.0 
Sweden 12.0 
UK 11.2 
Greece 11.0 
 
* The Regional Authority Index (RAI) is a measure of the authority of regional 
governments in 81 democracies or quasi-democracies on an annual basis over the 
period 1950-2010. The dataset encompasses subnational government levels with an 
average population of 150,000 or more. Regional authority is measured along ten 
dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, 
representation, law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, and 
constitutional reform. 
 
Source: Data from Arjan Schakel (2018) 
https://www.arjanschakel.nl/index.php/regional-authority-index 
 
  
 12 
Figure 1: Regional Authority Index, UK, 1950-2010 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated from data from Arjan Schakel (2018) 
https://www.arjanschakel.nl/index.php/regional-authority-index 
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 13 
Figure 2: Gini index of inequality of GDP per capita across TL3 regions, 2000 
and 2013* 
 
 
 
 
*GBR = Great Britain 
 
Source: OECD Regional Statistics (2015) (database) in OECD (2016) Regions at 
a Glance, OECD: Paris 
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Figure 3: Pendulum swings in decentralised governance in England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2016) 
Decentralisation: Issues, Principles and Practice, CURDS: Newcastle University 
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Figure 4: Powers by Combined Authority area  
 
 
 
Source: Pike, A., Tomaney, J. and Jenkins, M. (2019) The North of Tyne Metro-
Mayor: An Office Without Power?, CURDS: Newcastle University 
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Table 2: The benefits and costs of asymmetrical decentralisation 
 
Potential benefits Potential costs 
 
Accommodate diverse preferences for 
autonomy across regions  
 
Adapting the institutional and fiscal 
frameworks to the capacities of 
subnational governments 
 
Advanced form of place-based policies 
 
Experimenting 
 
Sequencing decentralisation 
 
Providing the enabling institutional 
environment to design territorial 
development strategies more targeted 
to local needs 
 
Tailoring solutions for special 
challenges 
 
 
Lack of accountability and transparency 
 
Complexity and coordination costs 
 
Lack of clarity for citizens 
 
Potential risks of increased disparities 
(in capacities) 
 
Secession and autonomy 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2019) Asymmetric Decentralisation: Policy 
Implications in Colombia, OECD: Paris. 
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Table 3: Forms of decentralisation 
 
Level Form Characteristics 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Administrative Administrative functions and 
responsibilities undertaken at the 
sub-national levels 
Deconcentration Dispersion of central government 
functions and responsibilities to sub-
national field offices. Powers 
transferred to lower-level actors who 
are accountable to their superiors in 
a hierarchy  
Delegation Transfer of policy responsibility to 
local government or semi-
autonomous organisations that are 
not controlled by central government 
but remain accountable to it  
Political Political functions of government and 
governance undertaken at the sub-
national level  
Fiscal Autonomy over tax, spending and 
public finances ceded by central 
government to sub-national levels  
Devolution Central government allows quasi-
autonomous local units of 
government to exercise power and 
control over the transferred policy 
 
Source: Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2016) 
Decentralisation: Issues, Principles and Practice, CURDS: Newcastle 
University. 
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Table 4: Potential benefits and costs of decentralisation 
 
Potential Benefits  Potential Costs 
Devolved policies better reflect 
territorial preferences (allocative 
efficiencies) 
  
Improved knowledge of territorial 
economic potential (productive 
efficiencies) 
 
Democratic accountability improves 
efficiency of policy formulation and 
implementation, fosters innovation  
  
Fiscal autonomy provides hard budget 
constraints and (where applicable) 
tax-varying power allows marginal 
changes to taxation and spending  
 
Lower coordination and compliance 
costs vis-à-vis the rest of the national 
territory 
Additional administrative costs of additional 
layers of government and/or governance 
institutions 
  
Loss of scale economies in policy 
formulation and delivery 
  
Increased ‘rent-seeking’ by interest groups 
better able to influence sub-national 
territorial rather than national institutions 
  
Weaker disciplines of monitoring and 
evaluation (national finance ministries as 
tougher drivers of efficiency than territorial 
institutions) 
  
Budget constraints increasingly tied to 
territorial fiscal capacity 
  
Weak incentives due to lack of mechanism 
linking public spending with tax revenues 
raised within sub-national territories  
  
Reduced coordination with the rest of the 
national territory with possible negative spill-
over effects both on and from sub-national 
territories 
 
Source: Adapted from Ashcroft, B., Swales, J. K. and McGregor, P. G. (2005) Is 
Devolution Good for the Scottish Economy? A Framework for Analysis. 
Devolution Briefings No. 26 (March 2005), ESRC Devolution and Constitutional 
Change Programme: London.  
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Table 5: Selected size measures of the UK and 5 broadly comparable countries 
  
  
population 
2019, million 
GDP 2018, 
billion Euro 
square kms, 
thousand 
France 67.0 2346 635.3 
Germany 83.0 3387 354.8 
Italy 60.4 1756 296.9 
Poland 38.0 490 307.2 
Spain 46.9 1216 506.3 
United Kingdom 66.6 2399 244.7 
 
Source: Calculated from Eurostat data 
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Table 6: Average size of regions with devolved economic responsibilities 
 
 No. 
population 
2019, million 
GDP 2018, 
billion Euro 
square kms, 
thousand 
French mainland Regions 13 5.2 180.5 48.9 
German Lander 16 5.2 211.7 22.2 
Italian Regioni 20 3.0 87.8 14.8 
Polish Voivodeships 16 2.4 30.6 19.2 
Spanish Autonomous Regions 17 2.8 71.5 29.8 
UK Nations/Provinces 7 9.5 342.8 35.0 
 
Source: Calculated from Eurostat data 
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Table 7: Regions with devolved economic responsibilities and populations >5m 
 
Country Regions,  
UK Provinces/Nations 
population 
2019, 
million 
square 
kms, 
thousand 
UK England: SE 22.7 39.8 
Germany Nordrhein-Westfalen 17.9 34.1 
UK England: North 14.9 38.2 
Germany Bayern 13.1 70.6 
France Île-de-France 12.1 12.0 
Germany Baden-Württemberg 11.0 35.8 
UK England: Midlands 10.1 28.6 
Italy Lombardia 10.1 23.8 
Spain Andalusia 8.4 87.3 
Germany Niedersachsen 7.9 47.6 
France Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes 7.9 69.7 
Spain Catalunya 7.5 32.1 
Spain Madrid 6.7 8.0 
Germany Hesse 6.2 21.1 
France Hauts-de-France 6.0 31.8 
Italy Lazio 5.9 17.2 
France Nouvelle-Aquitaine 5.9 84.1 
Italy Campania 5.8 13.7 
France Occitanie 5.8 72.7 
France Grand Est 5.6 57.4 
UK Scotland 5.4 77.9 
Poland Mazowsze 5.4 35.6 
UK England: SW 5.3 23.8 
Italy Sicilia 5.0 25.8 
France Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 5.0 31.4 
        
UK Wales 3.1 20.8 
UK N.Ireland 1.9 14.1 
 
Source: Calculated from Eurostat data 
 
 
